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NOTE
Employment Discrimination- Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corp.: Does Title VII Limit Executive Order
11246?
In November 1977 a decision that could seriously retard affirma-
tive action taken to remedy employment discrimination was issued by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, a court long-
noted for its progressive decisions in the area of civil rights. In Weber
v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.,' the court struck down a plan
implemented by Kaiser that guaranteed a fifty percent minority admis-
sion ratio into a craft apprenticeship program. The decision is the most
recent attempt by a federal court of appeals to interpret the possibly
conflicting provisions of Executive Order 11246,2 which demands that
government contractors take affirmative action to benefit minorities
and women, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3 which pro-
hibits race and sex discrimination in employment.4 Before Weber all
federal courts of appeals confronting the issue had sustained the legal-
ity of specific affirmative action plans instituted under the authority of
the Executive Order, despite the antidiscrimination provisions of title
VII.5 In Weber, however, the court held that Executive Order 11246
1. 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3408 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1978) (No.
78-435).
2. Exec. Order No. 11,246, as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375 & Exec. Order No.
11,478, 3 C.F.R. 173 (1973), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app., at 1232-36 (1976), and asfurther
amended by Exec. Order No. 12,086, 43 Fed. Reg. 46,501 (1978).
3. Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-15 (1976), quoted in part in notes 45-48 infra.
4. The potential conflict has generated considerable debate. See generally Blumrosen, Quo-
ta, Common Sense, and Law in Labor Relations: Three Dimensions of Equal Opportunity, 27
RUTErS L. REV. 675 (1974); Edwards & Zaretsky, PreferentiaiRemedies/or Employment Discrim-
ination, 74 MIcH. L. REV. 1 (1975); Jones, The Bugaboo ofEmployment Quotas, 1970 Wis. L. REV.
341; Leiken, Preferential Treatment in the Skilled Building Trades: An Analysis of the Philadelphia
Plan, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 84 (1970); Morgan, Achieving National Goals Through Federal Con-
tracts: Giving Form to an Unconstrained Administrative Process, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 301; Slate,
Preferential Relief in Enployment Discrimination Cases, 5 Loy. CHi. L.J. 315 (1974); Sape, The Use
of Numerical Quotas to Achieve Integration in Employment, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 481 (1975);
Venick & Lane, Doubling the Price ofPast Discriminatiorn The Employer's Burden After McDonald
v. Sante Fe Trail Transportation Co., 8 Loy. CmI. L.J. 789 (1977); Comment, How Far Can Affirm-
ative Action Go Before It Becomes Reverse Discrimination? 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 513 (1977); Note,
A Proposalfor Reconciling Affirmative Action with Nondiscrimination Under the Contractor Antidis-
crimination Program, 30 STAN. L. REV. 803 (1978).
5. See EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.
Ct. 3145 (1978); Mele v. EEOC, 532 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1976), arf'g mem. Mele v. United States
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violates title VII if it mandates the use of a racial quota in the absence
of prior discrimination by the employer.6
The legal precedent, legislative history, and policy reasons sup-
porting an employer's use of a quota to comply with the Executive Or-
der will be analyzed in this Note. These issues were largely unexplored
by the Weber majority. In addition, an analysis of the validity of using
quotas in the absence of findings of discrimination will be undertaken.
This issue was raised both in Weber and in the Supreme Court's later
decision in Regents of the University of Caifornia v. Bakke.7 Both deci-
sions draw attention to the problems inherent in distinguishing between
employer discrimination and societal discrimination when judging the
legality of affirmative action plans in employment.
BACKGROUND
In 1974, Kaiser Aluminum negotiated a collective bargaining
agreement with the United Steelworkers Union that established a new
on-the-job training program within designated plants to increase the
participation of minorities in the highly paid craft positions. Previ-
ously, Kaiser's official policy was to consider only workers with craft
experience outside the plant for craft apprentice and craft positions.8
Minority workers, who had been discriminated against by outside un-
ions, had no prior experience to qualify them for craft positions.9 Be-
cause of this outside discrimination, and possible discrimination by
Kaiser itself,'0 at Kaiser's Gramercy plant blacks held less than 2% of
the craft positions, although they constituted 39% of the surrounding
labor force." Under pressure from the Office of Federal Contract
Dep't of Justice, 395 F. Supp. 592 (D.N.J. 1975); Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d
680 (7th Cir. 1972); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 854 (1971). See also Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (lst Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974) (upholding Governor's executive order similar to Exec.
Order 11,246).
6. 563 F.2d at 227. Weber presents two important issues: whether a quota that is volunta-
rily implemented to remedy possible title VII violations is legal; and whether, regardless of any
title VII violations, a quota that is voluntarily implemented under the authority of Exec. Order
11246 is legal. Although the second issue is the focus of this Note, the issues are not separable,
since most quotas implemented to comply with the Executive Order also remedy arguable title VII
violations. See notes 26 & 27 and accompanying text infra.
7. 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
8. 563 F.2d at 218.
9. Id. at 234, 237 (dissenting opinion).
10. See notes 17 & 26 infra.
11. Prior to 1974 only 5 of 273 craft positions were held by blacks. Petition for Writ of
Certiorari on behalf of the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at
3.
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Compliance (OFCC), which enforces the Executive Order 2 to remedy
the underrepresentation of minorities, Kaiser and the union negotiated
an agreement that established a new in-plant training program.
3
Qualified white and black workers who previously had not met the
prior experience requirement were to be admitted in a one-to-one ratio
on the basis of seniority, with separate seniority lists maintained for the
two groups. Weber, a white male, sued when a black with less seniority
than he had was admitted into the program. 14
The evidence presented to the district court was sparse. Two Kai-
ser officials testified that Kaiser had not discriminated in the past, but
that past discrimination against blacks by outside craft unions justified
the imposition of the racial quota.'5 The statistics showing Kaiser's un-
derutilization of minorities were never analyzed by the court,' 6 nor
were OFCC findings concerning Kaiser's previous discrimination
introduced.7
The district court held that the Kaiser quota was illegal because
title VII only permits quotas when they are imposed by the courts after
judicial determinations of discrimination.' 8 Alternatively, the district
court held that Kaiser had not discriminated and thus the quota would
have been illegal even had it been imposed by a court. 9 In light of its
finding that Kaiser had not discriminated, the court found that the Ex-
ecutive Order and title VII were in conflict, since the Executive Order
seemed to require employers who had not discriminated to give prefer-
ential treatment to minorities.20
12. Exec. Order 11246 authorizes the Secretary of Labor to adopt such rules and regulations
as may be appropriate to administer the Order. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 201, 3 C.F.R. 173, 174
(1973). Pursuant to authority granted in the Executive Order, the Secretary has delegated this
authority to the Director of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance. Id. § 401, 3 C.F.R. 173,
181 (1973); 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.2 (1978).
13. Similar agreements were made throughout the aluminum industry. 563 F.2d at 218. The
affirmative action provisions in these agreements mirrored provisions in a nationwide steel settle-
ment that had been previously approved by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Allegheny-Lud-
lum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
14. 563 F.2d at 218.
15. Id. at 224.
16. Id. at 231 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
17. In 1971, following a compliance review, OFCC found that Kaiser was guilty of discrimi-
nation. In 1973, OFCC found that Kaiser had waived its prior experience requirements for whites
but not for blacks who had applied for craft positions. These findings were revealed by the Gov-
ernment, and were never brought out by Kaiser. Petition for Certiorari on behalf of the United
States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at 18.
18. 415 F. Supp. 761,767-68 (E.D. La. 1976), aft'd, 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted,
47 U.S.L.W. 3408 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1978) (No. 78-435).
19. Id. at 769.
20. Id.
1979]
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The court of appeals affirmed, one judge dissenting. The majority
disagreed with the district court's holding that only judicially imposed
quotas are legal.2 ' It affirmed, however, on the basis of the alternate
holding,22 stating that in the absence of prior employment discrimina-
tion, a racial quota "loses its character as an equitable remedy and must
be banned as an unlawful racial preference prohibited by Title VII.''23
Like the'district court, the court of appeals found that the Executive
Order could not validate the quota. Invoking Justice Jackson's separa-
tion-of-powers analysis in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 24
the court reasoned that if the Executive Order authorizes the use of a
racial quota in the absence of prior employment discrimination it con-
travenes congressional intent as expressed in title VII, and therefore is
illegal.2
In a strong dissent, Judge Wisdom argued that Kaiser's affirmative
action program was legal, both as a reasonable remedy for Kaiser's
own arguable violations of title VII26 and as a permissible voluntary
action to remedy the effects of past societal discrimination.27 With re-
gard to the Executive Order issue, Judge Wisdom noted that in 1972
Congress had implicitly affirmed the Executive Order, thereby exempt-
ing it from title VII.28 He concluded, however, that the case should be
21. 563 F.2d at 223.
22. Id. at 224. The district court's finding that Kaiser was not guilty of discrimination appar-
ently was based on the testimony of two Kaiser officials. The finding is questionable. As Judge
Wisdom argued, no litigant in the original proceeding wanted to prove any past discrimination by
Kaiser, and no one represented the interests of the minorities at Kaiser, the only persons who were
interested in showing the existence of past discrimination. Id. at 231 (dissenting opinion).
23. Id. at 224.
24. 343 U.S. 579 (1952), cited in 563 F.2d at 227. In Youngstown, Justice Jackson defined
three categories of presidential powers. According to Justice Jackson, the President's power is
greatest when he acts pursuant to express or implied congressional authorization. When the Presi-
dent acts in absence of a congressional authorization, he acts in a "twilight zone" in which both he
and Congress may exercise concurrent authority. When the President takes measures that are
incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress, his powers are only what he alone
possesses, and the action can be upheld only if the Constitution has delegated the authority to the
President, and not to Congress. Id. at 636-38.
25. 563 F.2d at 227.
26. Id. at 230 (dissenting opinion). Kaiser's arguable title VII liability was based on (1) a
prima facie case of discrimination, proven by the gross statistical underrepresentation of minori-
ties in both its general labor force and its skilled positions, (2) the prior experience requirement for
the limited craft training program that existed before 1974, and (3) the requirement that persons
hired for craft positions have previous training. Id. at 231-32 (dissenting opinion).
27. Id. at 234-36 (dissenting opinion).
28. Id. at 237-38 (dissenting opinion); see notes 80-92 and accompanying text infra.
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remanded to the district court to determine whether the quota em-
ployed by Kaiser violated the Order itself,29 and if it did not, whether
federal authorization of such a quota violates the Constitution.30
THE EXECUTIVE ORDER AND TITLE VII
The Executive Order program predates the effective date of title
VII by twenty-four years. Since 1941, successive Presidents have issued
executive orders prohibiting employment discrimination by govern-
ment contractors and subcontractors .3  For twenty years contractors
and subcontractors were merely required to follow a policy of nondis-
crimination. In 1961, however, President Kennedy added the obliga-
tion to take "affirmative action."' 32 This requirement was extended by
29. Id. at 238 (dissenting opinion). OFCC regulations contain a disclaimer of any intent to
impose a quota. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.12(e) (1978).
30. 563 F.2d at 238 n.24 (dissenting opinion). Judge Wisdom seemed to be questioning on
equal protection grounds the general constitutionality of any federal authorization for government
contractors to utilize quotas.
31. The major executive orders dealing with the obligations of government contractors and
subcontractors are Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943 Compilation); Exec. Order No.
9346, 3 C.F.R. 1280 (1938-1943 Compilation) (President Roosevelt); Exec. Order No. 10,308, 3
C.F.R. 837 (1949-1953 Compilation) (President Truman); Exec. Order No. 10,479, 3 C.F.R. 961
(1949-1953 Compilation) (President Eisenhower); Exec. Order No. 10,557, 3 C.F.R. 203 (1954-
1958 Compilation); Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963 Compilation); Exec. Order
No. 11,114, 3 C.F.R. 774 (1959-1963 Compilation) (President Kennedy); Exec. Order No. 11,246,
3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation); Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 320 (1966-1970 Compila-
tion) (President Johnson).
President Roosevelt's initial order, Exec. Order 8802, prohibited discrimination in employ-
ment on the basis of race, creed, color, and national origin. Exec. Order 11,375, issued in 1967,
extended the prohibition to sex discrimination.
Despite the long history of the Executive Order program, there is no clear statutory grant of
authority that gives the President the power to impose any requirements on government contrac-
tors that are unnecessary to the management and procurement of goods or services. One court
that has analyzed the basis of presidential authority has found that the Executive has the power to
further the legitimate government interest in expanding the labor supply as a means of guarantee-
ing the performance of government contracts. See Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442
F.2d 159, 175 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); Pasley, The Nondiscrimination Clause in
Government Contracts, 43 VA. L. REv. 837, 866-68 (1957); Comment, The Philadelphia Plan: A
Study in the Dynamics ofExecutive Power, 39 U. CHi. L. Rnv. 723, 726-32 (1972). Other courts
have more candidly asserted that the goal of equal employment itself, aside from any economic
benefits, validates Exec. Order 11246. See Rossetti Contracting Co. v. Brennan, 508 F.2d 1039,
1045 n.18 (7th Cir. 1975); Northeast Constr. Co. v. Romney, 485 F.2d 752, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
For excellent discussions of the limits of presidential power in the area, see Morgan, Achieving
National Goals Through Federal Contracts: Giving Form to an UnconstrainedAdministrative Proc-
ess, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 301, 301-13; Comment, supra.
32. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963 Compilation).
I
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President Johnson in Executive Order 11246, issued in 1965.21 Pursu-
ant to authority granted in Executive Order 11246,34 the Secretary of
Labor subsequently issued regulations defining the content of "affirma-
tive action. ' 35 These regulations require nonconstruction contractors
and subcontractors with fifty or more employees and a contract of
$50,000 with the federal government to develop written affirmative ac-
tion programs.36 This entails, among other things, conducting a
workforce analysis to determine whether minorities or women are "un-
derutilized" in any job category in light of their general availability. 37
An employer who finds that minorities or women are underutilized
must establish goals and timetables for hiring, training, and promotion
to correct the deficiencies.38 In addition, the employer must eliminate
unnecessary job prerequisites or qualifications, and "validate," or es-
tablish the job-relatedness of employment criteria that are considered
essentidl. 39
Neither the Executive Order itself nor OFCC regulations states
that minorities or females are to be preferred over other candidates. In
33. Exec. Order No. 11,246, as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375 & Exec. Order No.
11,478, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1976), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app. 1332-36 (1976).
The following language is included in all government contracts: "The contractor will take
affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during
employment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." fd. § 202, 3
C.F.R. 169, 170 (1976); 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.14(a) (1977).
For a brief history of the development of the executive order program, and the development
of the concept of affirmative action, see Note, Executive Order 11,246. Anti-Discrimination Obliga-
tons in Government Contracts, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 590, 590-96 (1969).
34. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 203(a), 3 C.F.R. 169, 171 (1976).
35. These rules and regulations are found at 41 C.F.R. § 60 (1978). Section 60-1 establishes
general rules applicable under the Executive Order. The sections specifically applicable to affirm-
ative action are § 60-2, Revised Order No. 4, which details affirmative action requirements for
nonconstruction contractors; § 60-4, which gives requirements for construction contractors; § 60-
20, which contains sex discrimination guidelines; and § 60-60, Revised Order No. 14, which con-
tains standard review procedures to determine compliance with affirmative action requirements
for nonconstruction contractors.
36. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40(a) (1978). The content and design of these programs is set out in
Revised Order No. 4, id. § 60-2.1 to .32.
37. The employer must apply the following criteria in determining whether minorities are
underutilized: (1) the minority population of the labor area surrounding the facility; (2) the size of
the minority unemployment force in the labor area surrounding the facility; (3) the percentage of
minority work force as compared with the total work force in the immediate labor area; (4) the
general availability of minorities having requisite skills in the immediate labor area; (5) the availa-
bility of minorities having requisite skills in an area in which the contractor can reasonably re-
cruit; (6) the availability of promotable minority employees within the contractor's organization;
(7) the existence of training institutions capable of training minorities in the requisite skills; and
(8) the degree of training the contractor is reasonably able to undertake as a means of making all
job classifications available to minorities. Id. § 60-2.11(b).
38. Id. § 60-2.10.
39. Id. § 60-2.24.
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fact, the Executive Order itself contains a nondiscrimination clause,40
and OFCC regulations both disclaim any intent to impose a rigid
quota4 ' and direct that a goal should not be used to discriminate
against any applicant.42 However, these prohibitions must be read in
light of the OFCC regulations requiring the use of goals. The obvious
objective of the goals approach is to broaden an employer's recruitment
base and promote the hiring or advancement of minorities or women
who may formerly have been considered unqualified or less qualified
than competing majority group workers. An effective affirmative ac-
tion program probably both expands the pool of applicants who are
considered equally qualified and affords minorities or females some
preference because of their status. This will necessarily be the case
whenever the percentage goal of minorities or females to be hired or
promoted in a given year actually exceeds that group's percentage in
the hiring or promotion pool.43 Additionally, any time a goal is con-
sistently met because the number of qualified minority workers exceeds
the goal established, the goal will appear to be a quota.
In light of the obvious objective of the Executive Order pro-
gram-to eliminate discrimination against minorities and women-the
antidiscrimination language in the Order and the regulations should
probably be interpreted to afford only constitutional guarantees, rather
than absolutely prohibiting preferential treatment.' And considering
the goals requirement, the OFCC regulations prohibiting rigid quotas
should probably be construed as only prohibiting goals that require the
hiring of unqualified persons.
Unlike the Executive Order program, title VII does not demand
that employers take any voluntary affirmative action. In fact, although
40. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 202, 3 C.F.R. 173, 174 (1973).
41. "Goals may not be rigid and inflexible quotas which must be met, but must be targets
reasonably attainable by means of applying every good faith effort to make all aspects of the
entire affirmative action program work." 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.12(e) (1978).
42. Id. § 60-2.30.
43. The following example illustrates this point: Thirty percent of X's workforce of 100 are
minority. Only 10% of the supervisors are minority. Xwants to increase the percentage of super-
visors to correct the underutilization of minorities in the supervisory job category, so X may im-
plement a 50% ratio for minority promotion and choose minorities for 5 of 10 new supervisory
positions. However, assuming that all of X's workforce is basically qualified to be supervisor,
normally -only 3 of the new supervisors would be minority. Any individual minority enjoys a
better chance for promotion than a nonminority-in the above example, a 17% chance compared
to a 7% chance.
44. Such a construction is consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the nondis-
crimination clause in title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). See Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
1979]
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title VII was enacted to prohibit discrimination against minorities, vari-
ous provisions can be interpreted to prohibit remedial affirmative ac-
tion favoring minorities. In particular, these provisions are section
703(a), which makes discrimination in hiring and in terms and condi-
tions of employment illegal;4" section 703(d), which makes discrimina-
tion in training and apprenticeship programs illegal; 6 section 703(h),
which protects "bona fide" seniority systems;4 7 and section 703(j),
which provides that title VII shall not be interpreted to require any
employer to grant preferential treatment on account of a statistical im-
balance between the number of minority workers in the employer's
work force and their availability in the labor market.4a
Prior to Weber, the possible conflict between the Executive Order
and title VII had been examined in two different contexts. Initial at-
tacks on the Order's validity were made by construction contractors
who challenged the imposition of minority hiring goals by the Depart-
ment of Labor to remedy third-party discrimination by trade unions.49
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). The provision states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportu-
nities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individ-
uars race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
46. Id. § 2000e-2(d). The provision states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or
joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or re-
training, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any individual
because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or employ-
ment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.
47. Id. § 2000e-2(h). The provision states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an Oinlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or dif-
ferent terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or
merit system. . . provided that such diffeerences [sic] are not the result of an intention
to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. ...
48. Id. § 2000e-2(j). The provision states:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer. . . to
grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance
which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer. . . in comparison
with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work
force. . ..
49. The first use of the "goals and timetables" approach to affirmative action was in 1967 in
the construction industry. In an attempt to remedy the virtually complete exclusion of minorities
1979] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
More recently, various white male plaintiffs have challenged quotas
from the skilled trades the Department of Labor held hearings in different geographic areas to
determine the extent of minority underutilization in various skilled trades and to set minimum
acceptable ranges for minority utilization. Following these hearings, area-wide plans were im-
posed in a number of cities. The plans required contractors and subcontractors to commit them-
selves to goals within acceptable ranges in their bids for government projects. Construction
contractors had to commit themselves to minority hiring goals even though outside trade unions
were guilty of the prior discrimination. The contractors, in order to meet their goals, were forced
either to break their collective bargaining contracts with outside unions, which called for hiring
through the hiring hall referral system, or to put pressure on the unions to change their hiring,
seniority, and apprenticeship provisions to elevate minority tradesmen to skilled worker status
within a shortened time period. The first construction industry plan to use the goals and timeta-
bles approach was the Cleveland Plan, which used "manning tables" to increase hiring of minori-
ties. However, the approach was not fully adopted until the Philadelphia Plan was imposed in
1967. As of 1975, there were imposed plans in seven cities. See Leiken, supra note 4, at 84-90.
The provisions of the imposed plans, along with the Department of Labor findings, are found at
41 C.F.R. § 60-5 to -11 (1977).
In addition, since 1970, voluntary "hometown" plans have been adopted in a number of
cities. Voluntary plans are developed by local unions, contractors, and minority groups, and are
subsequently reviewed by OFCC regional offices. Hometown plans, like imposed plans, include
goals, or ranges of goals for minority utilization. 5 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, 1974: To ELIMINATE EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION 345-62 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 5 U.S.C.C.R., 1974: DISCRIMINATION];
Leiken, supra note 4, at 91.
In April 1978, extensive revisions to the affirmative action regulations in the construction
industry were made. Construction contractors now operate under the same goals and timetables
approach as nonconstruction contractors. Imposed plans have been eliminated and hiring goals
for women have been set for the first time. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-4.1 to .9 (1978).
For analysis of the various plans, see generally Gould, The Seattle Building Trades Order.-
The First Comprehensive ReliefAgainst Employment Discrimination in the Construction Industry, 26
STAN. L. REV. 773 (1974); Jones, supra note 4; Leiken, supra note 4; Nash, Affirmative Action
Under Executive Order 11,246, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 225 (1971); Comment, he Philadelphia Plan
and Strict Racial Quotas in Federal Contracts, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 817 (1970); Note, Executive
Order 11,246 Anti-Discrimination Obligations in Government Contracts, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 590
(1969).
Challenges on both constitutional and statutory grounds to these plans and to similar state
plans were raised by contractors and unions. Courts, however, have consistently upheld the plans.
See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 957 (1974) (upholding similar state plan under Governor's executive authority against attack
on constitutional grounds and on grounds that plan conflicted with antipreference provision of
Massachusetts law similar to title VII); Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th
Cir. 1972) (upholding "Ogilvie Plan" against challenge based on Constitution and title VII); Con-
tractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971)
(upholding "Philadelphia Plan" against challenges based on Constitution, title VI, title VII, and
National Labor Relations Act); Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1970) (upholding
plan against title VII attack); Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 19 Ohio St. 2d 35,
249 N.E.2d 907 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1970) (upholding state plan).
Courts have also relied on the Executive Order for legal authority to issue injunctions against
unions that impeded the operation of various plans. See, e.g., United States v. Local 212, IBEW,
472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973) (union that continued to discriminate in referrals and membership
required to become participant in plan); United States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851 (1972) (union forced to issue work permits to minorities trained
under federal program rather than under union's apprenticeship program).
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contained in the consent decree that ended lengthy government investi-
gation of A.T. & T. following charges of massive employment discrimi-
nation.5 0  These quotas provided for the promotion of women and
minorities over white males with greater seniority.
In interpreting the provisions of title VII and the Executive Order,
courts of appeals have consistently concluded that title VII and the Ex-
ecutive Order are complementary, rather than contradictory.5' Al-
though title VII was generally interpreted to require race-neutral
employment practices, the courts created an exemption from this re-
quirement of race neutrality for racial preferences authorized by the
Executive Order. To support this exemption, the courts looked in part
to the legislative history and purpose of title VII. For example, in Con-
tractors Association v. Secretary of Labor,52 the seminal pre-1972 deci-
sion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found
that Congress did not intend to foreclose remedial affirmative action
taken under other authority by passing title VII in 1964.13 Accordingly,
the court held that sections 703(h) and (j) did not limit the Executive
Order, and that, considering that white workers would not be excluded
from any jobs, section 703(a) did not prohibit some minority prefer-
ence.5 4 More recent decisions have interpreted congressional rejection
50. In 1973, after years of investigation by the EEOC, the Department of Labor, and other
government representatives, charges were filed against A.T. & T. under title VII, Exec. Order
11,246, and the Equal Pay Act. Concurrent with the filing of charges, two consent decrees were
entered and approved. The decrees provided for a substantial back pay award and for a "seniority
override" to accelerate advancement of minority group workers over majority group workers with
greater seniority. A.T. & T. disclaimed any past discrimination. Challenges to the decree were
raised by unions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the legality
under title VII and the constitutionality of the plan in EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556
F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977). The Supreme Court, immediately following Bakke, denied certioriari. 98
S. Ct. 3145 (1978). Individual plaintiffs passed over because of the seniority override have also
challenged the decree under § 703(a) of title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). See Mele v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 395 F. Supp. 592 (D.N.J. 1975), aff'dmem., 532 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.
1976) (plan was put into effect under authority of the Executive Order, and thus is immune from
title VII attack). But see McAleer v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 416 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1976)
(court would not enjoin valid consent decree but would award plaintiff damages for violation of
his statutory rights under § 703(a)). See generally 5 U.S.C.C.R., 1974: DISCRIMINATION, supra
note 49, at 549-56.
The A.T. & T. consent decrees are reprinted at 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 431:73 (1978). The
decrees expired in January 1979 and were not continued since A.T. & T. was found to have sub-
stantially complied with the provisions of the decrees. See Final Report onAt. T & T's Compliance
wilh Consent Decree, id. at 431:124(1).
51. See cases cited notes 49 & 50 supra.
52. 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). The opinion in Contractors
Association is the most extensive treatment of the statutory issues raised in opposition to the con-
struction industry plans.
53. Id. at 171, 173.
54. Id. at 172-73.
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
in 1972 of amendments that would have made goals and quotas ex-
pressly illega 5 5 as congressional affirmation that goals and timetables
are not prohibited by title VII.56
Early decisions upholding the Executive Order were less than can-
did in analyzing whether the Executive Order can mandate goals or
quotas that actually exclude whites from employment opportunities. In
general, the construction industry cases tended to ignore the thorny is-
sue of the degree of racial preference authorized under the Executive
Order. Some decisions noted that goals would not adversely affect
whites.57 Others ignored the effect on white workers but stressed that
the goals were not rigid, and did not force the hiring of unqualified or
less qualified minority workers.58 Despite the tendency in early cases
to avoid the issue of the effect of goals on white workers, the early cases
nevertheless implicitly affirm that some degree of racial preference is
authorized by the Executive Order. The clearest support for the use of
a goal or quota that has an obvious exclusionary effect is offered by the
more recent A.T. & T. litigation, EEOC v. American Telephone & Tele-
graph Co.,59 in which strict numerical goals instituted via consent de-
cree were upheld.6
Previous Executive Order cases attempted to harmonize the
OFCC program and title VII by emphasizing the remedial nature of
the challenged goals or quotas and analogizing them to quotas imposed
by the judiciary to correct proven title VII discrimination. No decision
expressly discussed whether evidence of minority underutilization
alone is sufficient to support the conclusion that a goal or quota is prop-
erly remedial. Since there was previous administrative consideration of
55. See notes 79-92 and accompanying text infra.
56. See, e.g., EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167, 177 (3d Cir. 1977), cer.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 3145 (1978).
57. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d at 164, 173 ("Philadelphia
Plan" contains assurance that goals are not to be used to discriminate against qualified applicants;
Department of Labor made findings that there would be no "adverse impact" on white work
force).
58. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974) (some preference to "equally qualified" minorities is legal);
Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 1972) ("goals" will be inter-
preted flexibly); Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284, 1291 (D.N.J. 1970) (goals are not quotas
and contractors must only put forth "good faith [effort]" to meet goals in order to avoid sanctions);
Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 39, 249 N.E.2d 907, 910 (1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1970) (goal is not quota; quota would violate title V1I).
59. 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3145 (1978), discussedin note 50 supra.
60. Id. at 174.
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the evidence of discrimination in most cases,6 the decisions can possi-
bly be construed to support preferential treatment only when there has
been a previous finding of discrimination.62 Before goals were imposed
in the construction industry, the Department of Labor held administra-
tive hearings and made findings of exclusionary practices by outside
trade unions.63 And negotiation of the consent decree with A.T. & T.
required extensive involvement by both the OFCC and the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)." Prior administrative
involvement and administrative findings were not essential to prior de-
cisions, however. No decision was expressly conditioned on prior ad-
ministrative action. Rather, the factor seems to have been only one of
many factors the courts cited to support the presumption of actual em-
ployment discrimination. In addition, courts noted extreme statistical
underrepresentations of minorities in certain trades and cited title VII
suits showing discrimination in skilled trades.65
In summary, in prior Executive Order decisions, title VII and the
Executive Order were considered complementary. Some courts found
it necessary to emphasize that whites were not excluded from employ-
ment opportunities. The most important factor noted by the courts in
harmonizing title VII and the Executive Order, however, was the con-
sonance in the respective purposes of the two programs-the elimina-
tion and remedying of discrimination against minorities. Significantly,
61. See, e.g., Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 1972) ("Ogil-
vie Plan" involved participation by federal officials); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442
F.2d at 162-63 (Department of Labor findings of exclusionary practices by unions); Joyce v. Mc-
Crane, 320 F. Supp. 1284, 1287, 1290, 1292 (D.N.J. 1970) (OFCC hearings resulted in findings
that some unions guilty of exclusionary practices).
62. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974) (long history of racial discrimination in construction unions);
Southern I11. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 1972) (previous title VII suit
showing history of discrimination in highway construction); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of La-
bor, 442 F.2d at 162-63, 173 (orders issued by Department of Labor found prior exclusionary
practices by unions); Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284, 1287, 1289, 1290, 1292 (D.N.J. 1970)
(record of near total minority exclusion in certain trades and government findings that "some
unions are guilty of exclusionary practices").
63. Summaries of the findings made prior to the development of the imposed plans are found
at 41 C.F.R. § 60-5 to -11 (1977). Significantly, Department of Labor hearings were not held
before the development of the numerous hometown plans discussed in note 49 supra.
64. Investigation of charges against A.T. & T. took over two years. The EEOC was involved
to a much greater degree than the OFCC. An EEOC investigative task force put 13.5 person-years
into compiling a preliminary report issued in December 1971, over one year before the consent
decree was signed. 5 U.S.C.C.R., 1974: DISCRIMINATION, supra note 49, at 549-52, 550 n.1661.
65. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9, 18 (lst Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974) (low percentage of minorities is evidence of discrimination);
Southern I11. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 1972) (virtually nonexistent
minority representation in trades compared to demographic statistics shows discrimination).
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no court made any findings of title VII discrimination,66 nor did any
court insist that the party instituting the goals be the discriminating
party. Finally, no court required that the beneficiaries of the goals be
persons who were, in fact, discriminated against. In contrast to the
Weber court's conclusion that only "actual" title VII discrimination on
the part of the employer can legalize the use of a goal,67 prior cases
support the legality of goals whenever they are used to remedy any
arguable employment discrimination.
CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF TITLE VII
AND THE EXECUTIVE ORDER
In determining that remedial action taken under the authority of
the Executive Order is limited by title VII, the Weber majority ignored
the possibility of congressional ratification of the Executive Order.68
Yet, interpretation of congressional consideration of the Executive Or-
der in 1964 and in 1972 is significant. Even if sections 703 (a) and (d)
of title VII are interpreted to require racial neutrality, congressional
ratification could make actions taken in compliance with the Executive
Order exempt from these sections. Congressional ratification would
also indicate congressional approval of the goal of remedying discrimi-
nation, whatever the source, through the imposition by the OFCC of
race-conscious affirmative action obligations on employers that have
not been adjudged guilty of any title VII violations.
Legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 offers only slight
support for the use of remedial racial preferences in any circumstance.
66. "Title VII discrimination" differs from discrimination that violates the Executive Order.
Title VII protects "bona fide" seniority systems. Title VII also allows no remedy for discrimina-
tion occurring prior to 1965. The Executive Order, on the other hand, contains no exemption for
bona fide seniority systems, and is not limited in time.
Although the Department of Labor made findings of "exclusionary practices" in the con-
struction cases, these findings were not made pursuant to adjudication of title VII issues. The
Department of Labor findings were based primarily on the virtual total exclusion of minorities
from certain trades, as shown by statistics. Jones, supra note 4, at 368; Nash, supra note 49, at 232;
See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. § 60-5.10 (1977). Such a statistical showing is only a prima facie title VII
violation, and can be rebutted by evidence of business necessity or the operation of a bona fide
seniority system. It is true that, had there been a court adjudication, the unions would probably
have been found guilty of title VII discrimination. The important fact, however, is that none of
the courts themselves considered it necessary to make a finding of actual title VII discrimination
in order to legalize the challenged goals.
67. 563 F.2d at 224, 226, 227.
68. Judge Wisdom, in contrast, relied on congressional ratification in 1972 to support his
theory that Congress has exempted the Executive Order from title VII. 563 F.2d at 237-38 (dis-
senting opinion).
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In fact, it appears that the Congress thought that section 7030),69 which
states that title VII does not require employers to use preferences to
remedy statistical imbalances, would prohibit even court-ordered quo-
tas.70 Goals imposed by the Executive Order were not explicitly con-
sidered since the general affirmative action requirement had only
recently been added by President Kennedy, and since the goals and
timetables approach was not yet in use.7 1 Two implications can, how-
ever, be drawn from the language of 7030) that offer some support for
an employer's voluntary use of a remedial-preference. The first is that
the very passage of section 7030) demonstrates that there was no clear
consensus about whether sections 703(a) and (d) would in themselves
prohibit racial preferences for minorities. 72 The second is that, al-
though title VII might not require employment preferences for minori-
ties, employers might use them voluntarily. Although both of these
interpretations contradict remarks made while title VII was being de-
bated,73 they are not unsupportable, considering that the main concern
of the 1964 Congress was to eliminate racial discrimination against
blacks and not to legislate on the permissibility of using remedial
preferences.74
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976), quoted in note 48 supra.
70. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 6549 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey):
Contrary to the allegations of some opponents of this title, there is nothing in it that
will give any power to the Commission or to any court to require hiring, firing, or pro-
motion of employees in order to meet a racial "quota" or to achieve a certain racial
balance.
That bugaboo has been brought up a dozen times; but it is nonexistent. In fact, the
very opposite is true. Title VII prohibits discrimination.
See also id. at 8921 (remarks of Sen. Williams).
71. The obligation to take "affirmative action" was added in 1961 by Exec. Order No. 10,925,
§ 301, 3 C.F.R. 448, 449-50 (1959-1963 Compilation). Goals and timetables were not used in the
construction industry until 1967. See note 49 supra. They were made a general requirement for
all contractors and subcontractors in 1968. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40 (1978) (originally became
effective on July 1, 1968, 33 Fed. Reg. 7804 (1968)). The more detailed affirmative action require-
ments for nonconstruction contractors contained in Order No. 4, now Revised Order No. 4, be-
came effective in 1970. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-2 (1978), originally issuedin 35 Fed. Reg. 2586 (1970).
72. Cf. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. at 2780-82 & 2781 n.28, 2772-74
(Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting) (similar interpre-
tation of title VI).
73. See note 70 supra. See also Interpretative Memorandum of Title VII of H.R. 7152,
submitted jointly by Senators Clark and Case:
There is no requirement in Title VII that an employer maintain a racial balance in his
work force. On the contrary, any deliberate attempt to maintain a racial balance,
whatever such balance may be, would involve a violation of Title VII because maintain-
ing such a balance would require an employer to hire or refuse to hire on the basis of
race.
110 CONG. REC. 7212, 7213 (1964).
74. For a similar interpretation of title VI, see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct.
at 2746-47 (intent of Congress in passing title VI in 1964 was to prohibit discrimination against
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Despite the language of sections 703(a), (d), and (j), courts have
regularly used quotas to remedy proven title VII discrimination.75 In
doing so, courts have relied on the argument that the scope of remedial
power granted to courts in section 706(g) 76 is not limited by the lan-
guage in section 703. 7 The Supreme Court has not considered this
interpretation with regard to quotas, but it has accepted the theory in
granting seniority relief.78 Aside from the absence of express limitation
on the court's remedial powers in section 706(g), the primary support
for the use of quotas by the judiciary comes from actions taken by Con-
gress in the course of passing the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972, 79 which amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964. At that time
the Senate voted down an amendment that would have specifically pro-
hibited the imposition of goals or quotas by government agencies, in-
cluding perhaps the courts. 8° Rejection of this amendment has been
blacks). See generally Vaas, Title VII Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & Com. L. REV. 431
(1966).
75. See, e.g., Boston NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1026-27 (1st Cir. 1974) (upholding
ratio hiring until minority percentage in work force equals minority percentage in labor force);
NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974) (upholding one to one hiring ratio until blacks
reach 25% of work force); United States v. N.L. Indus. Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 377 (8th Cir. 1973) (one
to one promotion ratio until 15% of foremen are black); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029
(3d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (upholding ratio hiring corresponding to black population and number of
black applicants); United States v. Local 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973) (upholding 11%
black quota in apprenticeship program); United States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851 (1972) (remanding to district court to fashion appropriate affirma-
tive relief); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 553 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 984 (197 1) (requiring union training program to select sufficient black applicants to overcome
past discrimination. But see Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977) (quota struck down when whites with greater seniority laid off ahead
of blacks with less seniority); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (court struck down quota that would have resulted in next 20 positions
being filled by minorities, but allowed ratio hiring of one black for every two whites).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976) provides in relevant part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
engaging in an unlawful employment practie ... the court may enjoin the respondent
from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action
as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring
of employees, with or without back pay. . . or any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate.
77. See Comment, Title VII and Preferential Treatment: The Compliance Dilemma, 7 TEX.
TECH. L. REv. 671, 689-92 (1976).
78. In Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), the Court used the theory that
§ 703(h), quoted in note 47 supra, was only a "definitional" provision that did not limit relief
available under § 706(g) in holding that a court generally must award retroactive seniority to
victims of discrimination. Id. at 758-62.
79. Pub. L. No. 92-26, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976)).
80. The amendment, proposed by Senator Ervin, read in part: "No department, agency, or
office of the United States shall require any employer to practice discrimination in reverse by
employing persons of a particular race ... in either fixed or variable numbers, proportions, per-
centages, quotas, goals, or ranges." 118 CoNG. REc. 1661 (1972). The amendment was proposed
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interpreted as an implicit affirmation that judicial power to remedy dis-
crimination is not limited by section 703.81
The same legislative history indicates that Congress similarly ex-
empted the Executive Order from the constraints of section 703. In
1972, debate over the goals and timetables approach had been raging
for four years. The "Philadelphia Plan," the subject of the Contractors
Association case,8" had received great attention. The Comptroller Gen-
eral declared the plan illegal in 1969. The Attorney General subse-
quently issued an opinion upholding the legality of the plan.83 A rider
that would have cut off funding for any project that the Comptroller
General declared illegal was defeated by Congress in 1969.84 Both im-
posed and voluntary plans incorporating goals and timetables were in
use in the construction industry,85 and regulations requiring noncon-
struction contractors to utilize goals and timetables had been in effect
since 1968.86
In summary, Congress in 1972 clearly understood that the OFCC,
in the absence of any findings of title VII violations, was forcing em-
ployers to adopt or accept race-conscious goals as a remedy either for
their own discrimination or for discrimination by outside parties. This
was the context then in which both the House87 and the Senate88 de-
feated amendments that would have explicitly abolished the use of
primarily as a means of banning the use of goals under the Executive Order, id. at 1663, although
opponents, attempting to defeat the amendment, stressed that it could restrict the use of quotas by
courts as well, id. at 1665-75. In speaking against the amendment, Senator Javits quoted from the
opinion in Contractors.Association and had the opinion printed in the record. Id. at 1665-76. The
amendment was soundly defeated, 22 to 44. .d. at 1676.
81. For example, this legislative history was cited by the Weber majority to support the fact
that quotas may be imposed by courts. 563 F.2d at 220. See EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
556 F.2d at 177; United States v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, 538 F.2d 1012,
1019-20 (3d Cir. 1976).
82. See note 49 supra.
83. See note 97 infra.
84. The Fannin rider was specifically intended to stop the imposition of goals and timetables
in the construction industry. The rider was passed by the Senate, 115 CONG. REC. 40,039 (1969),
defeated by the House, id. at 40,921, and, upon reconsideration, defeated by the Senate, id. at
40,749. See Comment, supra note 31 at 748-50 (author sees vote as qualified support for ratifica-
tion of Executive Order through appropriation).
85. See note 49 supra.
86. See note 71 upra.
87. Consideration of the quota issue in the House was not as clear-cut as it was in the Senate.
The Dent amendment, which would have combined the EEOC and the OFCC and prohibited the
EEOC from using quotas or preferential treatment, was added to the Hawkins-Reed bill, the bill
that was reported out of Committee. A substitute bill, the Erlenbom-Mazzoll bill, was offered
from the floor. The Hawkins bill gave the EEOC authority to issue cease and desist orders,
whereas the Erlenborm substitute only gave the EEOC authority to prosecute suits in the federal
courts. The issue of the EEOC's enforcement power was actually the critical point of difference
between the bills, but the quota issue was also important in the debate. Congressman Dent, before
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goals and timetables under the Executive Order. Debate in the Senate,
in particular, indicates that supporters and opponents of the OFCC
program understood that the Executive Order was not operating within
the constraints of title VII. 9 The Senate also voted down two amend-
ments that could have diluted or destroyed the unique affirmative ac-
tion components of the OFCC program.90  Debate over these
amendments clearly demonstrates congressional understanding that
the vote on the Erlenborn substitute, decided not to offer any amendments to the substitute so that
the House would have a choice between a bill that would continue the OFCC's imposition of
quotas, the Erlenborn substitute, and a bill that would prohibit quotas, the Hawkins bill. SUB-
COMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 275-77 [hereinafter cited as
1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (remarks of Congresswoman Abzug) (summary of differences in the
bills); id. at 254-56 (remarks of Congressman Dent) ("the two bills offer a clear-cut choice for and
against quotas"). Ironically, many liberals supported the Hawkins bill, despite the inclusion of the
Dent amendment, since it gave the EEOC stronger enforcement authority. The Erlenborn substi-
tute, without the Dent amendment, was accepted by the House, 202 to 194. Id. at 312.
88. The Senate defeated two amendments offered by Senator Ervin. The first would have
prohibited any government agency from using goals or quotas. See note 80 supra. The second
amendment would have specifically applied only to the Executive Order and not to the courts. It
would have amended § 7030) to read: "Nothing contained in this title or in Executive Order No.
11246, or in any other law or Executive Order, shall be interpreted to require any employer. . . to
grant preferential treatment .... " 118 CONG. REC. 4917 (1972) (emphasis added). It was de-
feated, 30 to 60. Id. at 4918; see Comment, supra note 31, at 754-57.
89. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 1386 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Saxbe) (discussing a different
amendment, stating that the Executive Order is independent of title VII and not subject to its
more restrictive provisions); id. at 4918 (remarks of Sen. Javits) (noting that federal government is
not limited by title VII if title VII requires color-blindness); id. at 4918 (remarks of Sen. Ervin)
(stating that the Executive Order is not, but should be, operating within limits of title VII).
90. Two amendments were proposed. The first amendment, which was defeated, would have
transferred the OFCC program to the EEOC. Senator Saxbe, speaking against the amendment,
stated:
The "affirmative action" concept is the mainstay of the Executive Order program ....
. .. The OFCC has utilized the proven business technique of establishing "goals
and timetables" to insure the success of the Executive Order program. It has been the
"goals and timetables" approach, which is unique to the OFCC's efforts in equal em-
ployment, coupled with extensive reporting and monitoring procedures that has given
the promise of equal employment opportunity a new credibility.
* * * The Executive Order program should not be confused with the judicial reme-
dies for proven discrimination which unfold on a limited and expensive case-by-case
basis. Rather, affirmative action means that all Government contractors must develop
programs to insure that all share equally in the jobs generated by the Federal Govern-
ment's spending. Proof of overt discrimination is not required.
Id. at 1385 (1972) (emphasis added).
Senator Saxbe also noted that violations of the Executive Order might be found when there
were no violations of title VII. Finally, he expressed concern that merging the OFCC and the
EEOC would result in renewed challenges to plans such as the Philadelphia Plan. Id. at 1386.
Congress also defeated an amendment that would have made title VII the exclusive federal
remedy for certain individuals. Id. at 3367-73, 3959-65. In opposing the amendment, Senator
Williams, one of the floor managers of the 1972 Act, noted that it could "bar enforcement of the
Government contract compliance program .... I cannot believe that the Senate would do that
after all the votes we have taken in the past 2 or 3 years to continue that program in full force and
effect." Id. at 3372.
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government contractors were being forced to take affirmative action
that was not required by title VII. These and other actions9' provide,
as one court has found, "unusually clear evidence" that Congress in
1972 recognized the existence of the Executive Order program, includ-
ing its goals and timetables requirements, and rejected efforts to restrict
or eliminate it.92
Congressional ratification of the Executive Order does not neces-
sarily mean that an employer's use of a quota to comply with OFCC
regulations is legal, however. It is possible that congressional ratifica-
tion could not effectively exempt the Executive Order from title VII.
And regardless of whether remedial action under the Executive Order
is subject to title VII, Congress may not have affirmed the use of quo-
tas. The Supreme Court in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States93 indicated that in interpreting a law a court must look
primarily to the intent of the Congress that enacted the law. Thus, in
holding in Teamsters that section 703(h) protects seniority systems that
perpetuate pre-1964 discrimination, the Court disregarded the apparent
understanding of the 1972 Congress that such systems were not "bona
fide" and looked to the contrary intent of the 1964 Congress.94 Similar
reasoning would dictate that the 1972 Congress could not exempt ac-
tions implemented to comply with the Executive Order from sections
703(a) and (d) if the 1964 Congress originally intended those sections to
apply to all employer action regardless of any governmental
authorization.
This result seems extreme, however, especially since if Congress
91. Additional evidence of Senate ratification comes from the section-by-section analysis of
the amendments undertaken by the Senate Subcommittee on Labor. With the decision in Con-
traclorsAssoeialion and its holding that §§ 703(a), 703(h), and 7030) of title VII are not applicable
to the Executive Order clearly before the Congress, the subcommittee provided: "In any area
where the new law does not address itself, or any areas where a specific contrary intention is not
indicated, it was assumed that the present case law as developed by the courts would continue to
govern the applicability and construction of Title VII." 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
87, at 1844.
Finally, Senate affirmation of the Executive Order in 1972 can be inferred from the adoption
of two provisions designed to make the program fairer and more efficient. The Javits amendment,
which became § 715, created the Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinating Council, com-
posed, in part, of the Secretary of Labor and the Chairman of the EEOC to "maximize effort,
promote efficiency, and eliminate conflict and inconsistency" among the departments and agencies
responsible for equal employment policies. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14 (1976). Section 718, requiring a
hearing and adjudication before a contract with a contractor who has an approved affirmative
action program can be terminated, was also approved. Id. § 2000e-17.
92. United States v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, 538 F.2d 1012, 1019-20
(3d Cir. 1976).
93. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
94. Id. at 353-54, 354 n.39 (1977).
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could not effectively exempt the Executive Order from the operation of
section 703 in 1972, neither could it effectively exempt the courts.
95
Thus all court-imposed quotas would be illegal. In fact, the question
whether Congress intended to exempt the courts or the executive
branch from title VII's constraints is largely irrelevant if one interprets
section 703 to apply only constitutional standards to all remedial af-
firmative action plans.96 If, instead, section 703 embodies a race-neu-
tral standard, however, an exemption for remedial action authorized by
the courts or by Executive Order is reasonable, considering that the
1972 Congress gave greater consideration to the issue of affirmative ac-
tion than did the 1964 Congress.
It can also be argued that congressional ratification of the Execu-
tive Order in 1972 did not encompass the use of quotas. The distinc-
tion between goals and quotas may be one of semantics, but it was
generally voiced in 1972.97 Accordingly, it can be argued that Congress
95. See notes 70-81 and accompanying text supra.
96. This interpretation was adopted by five justices in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978). See notes 115-19 and accompanying text infra.
97. The Philadelphia Plan and similar plans in the construction trades were the focus of
intense debate from 1969 to 1972. The Comptroller General in 1969 ruled that the goals con-
tained within the plans were quotas and were illegal. 49 Comp. Gen. 59 (1969). The Attorney
General, in response, issued a statement declaring that the goals did not violate title VII. 42 Op.
Att'y Gen. 405 (1969). The gist of the Attorney General's opinion was that race-conscious reme-
dial action does not violate title VII, although totally excluding whites from consideration for
positions might be illegal:
The hiring process, viewed realistically, does not begin and end with the employer's
choice among competing applicants. The standards he sets for consideration of appli-
cants, the methods he uses to evaluate qualifications, his techniques for communicating
information as to vacancies, the audience to which he communicates such information,
are all factors likely to have a real and a predictable effect on the racial composition of
his work force. Title VII does not prohibit some structuring of the hiring process, such as
the broadening of the recruitment base, to encourage the employment of members of
minority groups.
Id. at 411.
President Nixon also distinguished between goals and quotas. See Statement by the Presi-
dent Urging Senate and House Conferees to Permit Continued Implementation, 5 WEEKLY COMP.
OF PREs. Doc. 1762 (1969) (Philadelphia Plan sets goals, not quotas); President's Radio Address, 8
WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1343 (1972) (fixed quotas are unfair and are a short-cut to equal
opportunity).
The President's statements must be viewed critically since some were made in the context of
the President's political "courting" of construction unions. See Gould, Labor & Nixon: Moving
the Hard Hats In, NATION, Jan. 8, 1973, at 41, cited in W. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE
UNIONS: JOB DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES 339 n.16 (1977). If President Nixon had
wished to assure that goals would not be used as quotas, he could have issued an Executive Order
to that effect and definitively settled the controversy. Also, the President objected to quotas be-
cause they were a "detour away from measuring a person on the basis of his ability." President's
Radio Address, supra. However, in any situation where employees are not chosen on the basis of
ability or on the basis of a number of factors, but are chosen purely on the basis of seniority,
which has little to do with ability, then quotas may be more defensible.
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only affirmed the use of goals. The political rhetoric concerning the
distinction between goals and quotas should not necessarily be inter-
preted as an absolute limit on the type of affirmative action permissible
under the Executive Order, however. What seems critical is congres-
sional ratification of the concept of affording minorities a remedial
preference.98 Whether a racial classification assumes the form of an
unquantified subjective preference, a quantified weight system, a goal,
or a quota may depend largely on the employment context. Hiring
goals in the construction industry, which were specifically at issue when
Congress rejected amendments to restrict the Executive Order in 1972,
were not quotas because the number of available qualified minority
workers was unknown.99 In a situation like Kaiser's, however, in which
the number of qualified available minorities exceeds the goal, the goal
will consistently be met and will appear to be a quota. The difference,
then, between the construction industry goals that were approved by
Congress and the Kaiser quota is in the predictability of the results,
and not necessarily in the degree of preference given. Because in many
situations the difference between a goal and a quota appears to be
merely a rhetorical one, congressional affirmation of the use of racial
preferences under the Executive Order should probably be interpreted
to include the use of quotas, at least when quotas do not result in the
hiring of unqualified workers.
POLICY REASONS FOR ALLOWING A SHOWING OF
UNDERUTILIZATION TO VALIDATE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
PLANS
If, as the Weber court found, a court must find "actual" title VII
discrimination when an employer's voluntary affirmative action pro-
gram is challenged, voluntary efforts to remedy past discrimination will
cease. Employment discrimination law has become a complex science,
and no employer can predict with any confidence whether a particular
98. Congress definitely approved the concept of a remedial preference. It would not have
been necessary to defeat the second Ervin amendment to title VII, see note 88 supra, had the
Congress thought that the Executive Order did not require any preferential treatment. Statements
about how the Executive Order was operating outside the constraints of title VII also show that
Congress understood that the Executive Order resulted in granting some preference to minorities.
See note 89 supra.
99. See note 49 supra.
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employment practice will be struck down by a court as discrimina-
tory. 10o An employer that knows it will be liable for reverse discrimi-
nation unless, when its affirmative action plan is challenged, a court
finds that the employer is guilty of actual discrimination, will not insti-
tute an affirmative action program at all. A flood of title VII suits by
minorities will ensue. Such suits are costly, time-consuming, and are
an enormous drain on judicial resources.
Requiring a judicial finding of title VII discrimination also
presents an evidentiary problem. Information necessary to make a
finding of title VII discrimination will typically not be before the court
in a reverse discrimination suit. For example, although Kaiser had an
interest in defending itself from Weber's claims of reverse discrimina-
tion, it had no interest in being adjudged guilty of discrimination under
title VII, which could invite further claims by minorities, or allow the
court to fashion additional remedial relief aside from the training
quota. Not surprisingly, rather than submitting as evidence OFCC
findings that it was guilty of discrimination,10 1 Kaiser presented oral
testimony indicating that it had not discriminated. Such "good faith"
declarations are given little weight in title VII suits.102 Therefore, the
district court's determination, accepted by the court of appeals, that
Kaiser had not actually discriminated0 3 was not well founded. The
court's related proposition that the Kaiser quota was implemented
solely to remedy "societal" discrimination"° is also debatable.
The possibility of using the utilization analysis mandated by the
Executive Order to determine whether Kaiser was warranted in imple-
menting an affirmative action plan was all but ignored by both the dis-
trict court and the court of appeals. Yet a statistical showing of gross
100. An employer cannot know with any certainty that (s)he is guilty of discrimination. This
is especially true when job requirements that may be justified by business necessity are at issue,
e.g., Kaiser's requirements for its apprenticeship program and its craft positions. The outcome of
cases in which an employer has used largely subjective criteria that have a disparate racial impact
is also difficult to predict. Kaiser could not know whether it was guilty of discrimination in its
hiring of the "most qualified" workers before 1969. It did know that its workforce in 1969 was
only 10% black. See 563 F.2d at 230 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
101. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
102. Two company officials testified that Kaiser had not discriminated, and that Kaiser had
hired the "most qualified" workers before 1969. 563 F.2d at 228 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). How-
ever, it is well-established in employment discrimination law that absence of discriminatory intent
is no defense when a practice that has a discriminatory impact is not justified by business neces-
sity. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
103. 563 F.2d at 224.
104. Id. at 224-26.
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underutilization should certainly carry some weight in a reverse dis-
crimination suit. Admittedly, demographic comparisons cannot isolate
the various sources--employer and societal-that have contributed to
an underrepresentation of minorities in an employer's work force." 5
Despite these limitations, however, the Supreme Court has recently ac-
cepted the idea that a prima facie case of title VII discrimination can be
established by proof that minorities are underrepresented in an em-
ployer's workforce in comparison with their availability in the labor
market.'0 6 Thus, even though the defenses available under title VII
and the Executive Order may differ slightly,107 at least the initial stages
of proving discrimination are the same under both title VII and the
105. See generally Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 235, 265-81
(1971); Hallock, The Numbers Game-The Use and Misuse of Statistics in Civil Rights Litigation,
23 VILL. L. REv. 5 (1977); Note, Employment Discriminatior" Statistics andPreferences Under Title
VII, 59 VA. L. REv. 463 (1973).
Factors contributing to an underrepresentation may include: pre-19 65 discrimination, for
which an employer is not liable under title VII; the operation of a seniority system that may be
bona fide; difference in qualifications of individual applicants in a pool of basically "qualified"
applicants; social or psychological factors that may discourage minorities or women from applying
for some jobs; housing patterns and transportation systems that may affect job selection. Despite
these problems, such statistics are regularly used to prove and to remedy title VII discrimination.
See cases cited note 75 supra. In all likelihood, statistics overstatean employer's actual title VII
violation. Similarly, their use in formulating quota remedies ensures that quotas will remedy
societal discrimination along with discrimination for which an employer is liable under title VII.
The conceptual distinction between employer discrimination and societal discrimination is
unclear. If an employer locates a plant in a suburban area because it is safer, and inner-city
residents therefore do not apply for jobs in a proportion that might be expected, it is difficult to
characterize the resultant underrepresentation as employer or societal discrimination. If women
are deterred from applying for particular industrial positions because they have been excluded
from such jobs in the past and no women currently hold those positions, the discrimination may,
again, be termed both employer discrimination and societal discrimination.
106. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308-09, & 309 n.14 (1977); Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 339-43, 33940 n.20 & 342 n.23. The
minority underrepresentation approach is only one way of proving discriminatory effect and a
prima facie case in a title VII suit. In the second method, the disparate impact approach, the
exclusionary effect of a particular job requirement is shown through a comparison of the percent-
age of minorities who are excluded by the requirement with the percentage of whites who are
excluded. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971).
107. Under title VII, bona fide seniority systems are protected. Also, employers can offer
statistical proof showing that a statistical disparity is caused by discrimination that occurred
before title VII took effect in 1965. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,
309 (1977). Finally, the employer can offer proof that the statistics are overbroad and do not
reflect the qualified population. Id. at 310-13.
A contractor cannot raise the first two defenses noted above to a charge of noncompliance
with the Executive Order. A contractor can use statistics showing the actual "qualified" popula-
tion to formulate goals. Yet the contractor must also consider how much training (s)he is able to
provide in order to make all job classifications available to minorities. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.11(b),
.23(a), (b) (1978). The obligation to provide a reasonable amount of compensatory training may
go beyond what is required by title VII. Yet if the business necessity defense is construed very
narrowly, employers under title VII may also have to train underqualified minorities. See Pett-
way v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 236-40 (5th Cir. 1974) (experience prerequisite
for eligibility for apprenticeship program and on-the-job training found to perpetuate effects of
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA TION
Executive Order; a statistical showing of underutilization under OFCC
guidelines establishes a presumptive violation of title VII. If, in the
face of such an underutilization, an employer chooses to give minorities
a hiring or promotional preference rather than validate existing em-
ployment criteria, or contest in court their business necessity,108 the
presumption that the employer has violated both title VII and the Ex-
ecutive Order should be even stronger. The employer, and not the
court, has greater knowledge concerning whether previous employment
practices were actually necessary.
Applying this to the Kaiser situation, the statistical utilization
analysis conducted by Kaiser under OFCC guidelines showed that
Kaiser was at least presumptively guilty of discrimination, both under
title VII and under the Executive Order. Faced with these statistics,
Kaiser and the predominately white Steelworkers Union implemented
a program granting some minority preference, rather than contesting
with the OFCC the validity of the previous requirements for craft and
craft apprentice positions. 0 9 At trial, the district court had no evidence
before it other than testimony of Kaiser officials to counter the pre-
sumption that Kaiser was guilty of both discrimination under title VII
and under the Executive Order. This presumption should have been
recognized by the court as sufficient support for the proposition that
Kaiser itself was probably guilty of discrimination, and that some af-
firmative action was therefore justified.
In summary, strong arguments favor a court's upholding a plan
past discrimination; district court ordered to consider whether experience prerequisite could be
shortened).
108. Between 1971 and 1978 OFCC guidelines and EEOC guidelines for validating scored
objective criteria were substantially the same. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 71-73 (1976). New guidelines to be used by both OFCC and EEOC took
effect on August 22, 1978. See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, LAB. REL.
REP. (BNA) 401:2231 (1977). The basic principles underlying these guidelines is that employer
practices that have an adverse impact on minorities are illegal unless they are justified by business
necessity.
There are no objective standards under OFCC or EEOC regulations for evaluating the legal-
ity of various nonscored objective criteria that an employer might use-for example, a prior expe-
rience or educational requirement. At the least, an employer must be able to show that the
requirements are job-related, and predictive ofjob performance. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN,
supra, at 143-47. It is arguable that any requirement that excludes virtually all minorities should
be justified by a higher standard of business utility than would otherwise be necessary. Id. at 146-
47.
109. It is not clear from the record exactly what entry requirements Kaiser used for its craft
positions, other than the prior experience requirement. At a different Kaiser plant, an entrance
test was used until 1968, and an educational prerequisite was used until 1970. See Parson v.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374, 1381 (5th Cir. 1978). Any test used would have
to be validated according to OFCC or EEOC guidelines.
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like Kaiser's without making actual findings of title VII discrimination.
Mandating such findings would only discourage employers from volun-
tarily taking action to remedy discrimination. Moreover, Congress in
ratifying the Executive Order in 1972 affirmed that goals could be used
in the absence of such findings."' Previous Executive Order cases were
not predicated on findings of discrimination, but on presumptions. 1
Similarly, quotas ordered pursuant to EEOC consent decrees and con-
ciliation agreements are upheld even though such argreements contain
employer disclaimers of title VII discrimination, and even though
courts do not examine the facts supporting title VII liability."12 Finally,
the affirmative action guidelines issued by the EEOC allow an em-
ployer to utilize a remedial preference in the absence of court find-
ings." 3  A utilization analysis under OFCC guidelines, and an
employer's reasonable evaluation that employment practices have an
adverse affect on minorities or that such practices leave uncorrected the
effects of prior discrimination, will immunize an employer from mone-
tary liability for reverse discrimination." 4
The court of appeals in Weber totally ignored congressional recog-
nition of the Executive Order program in 1972 and thereby refused to
acknowledge the independent validity of the OFCC requirements.
Also, by somewhat naively accepting Kaiser's allegations that it had
not discriminated, the court concluded that the Executive Order and
title VII conflicted and that the former mandated a racial preference in
the absence of discrimination. Proper analysis of statistics showing un-
derutilization, and judicial notice that such statistics are used in title
VII suits, would, however, have enabled the court to conclude that Kai-
ser was presumptively guilty of discrimination under both the Execu-
tive Order and title VII. The court could have upheld the Kaiser quota
under the strength of this presumption. Such a result would have pro-
moted voluntary compliance with title VII and would have furthered
the congressionally approved objective of imposing on government
contractors affirmative action requirements that may occasionally ex-
ceed what contractors have to do to comply with title VII.
110. Congress understood in 1972 that judicial findings of discrimination were not made
before goals were imposed on contractors. Congress also knew that goals were being voluntarily
adopted in hometown plans. See notes 49, 63, & 90 supra.
11l. See notes 63-66 and accompanying text supra.
112. See General Electric Conciliation Agreement, 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 431:53, 54 (1978);
Steel Industry Consent Decree I, id at 431:125; Consent Decree II, id at 431:147.
113. EEOC Affirmative Action Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. 4422 (1979).
114. Id. § 1608.4, 44 Fed. Reg. at 4449.
[Vol. 57
EMPLO YMENT DISCRIMINA TION
B4KKE AND THE EXECUTIVE ORDER
Some of the issues raised by the Weber opinion were addressed,
but not resolved, in the Supreme Court's first ruling on the voluntary
use of racial quotas, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. t" 5
In Bakke, a fragmented Court held that an admissions quota employed
by the Medical School of the University of California at Davis -violated
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.116 Four Justices (the Stevens
group) found that title VI imposes a requirement of strict racial neu-
trality,' t7 while five Justices (the Brennan group and Justice Powell)
held that title VI affords only constitutional protection to whites claim-
ing injury from an affirmative action plan. 18 Despite the invalidation
of the Davis quota, five Justices (the Brennan group and Justice Pow-
ell) held that race may be used as a factor in university admissions
programs. "19
Because of the peculiar split of the Court, Bakke is difficult to ap-
ply to Weber. The Court clarified only one issue-that even if title VII
is applicable to action taken under the Executive Order, the language
of section 703 probably codifies only equal protection guarantees when
applied to affirmative action. 20 The use of a constitutional standard to
judge the legality of affirmative action programs opens up possible ba-
ses for upholding voluntary affirmative action that were not considered
in Weber. Nevertheless, it is possible that the result reached in Weber
was correct. If a strict scrutiny test is applied to the Kaiser situation
115. 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976); see 98 S. Ct. at 2764 (Powell, J.); id. at 2813-14 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Burger, C.J., Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., joined in the
opinion). Five Justices held the quota illegal. Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Rehnquist and Stewart, decided the issue on statutory grounds. Justice Powell, holding
that title VI enacted constitutional principles, decided the issue on constitutional grounds.
117. Id. at 2814 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Burger, C.J., Stewart
and Rehnquist, JJ., joined in the opinion).
118. Id. at 2747 (Powell, J.); Id. at 2774 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concur-
ring in part and dissenting).
119. Id. at 2764 (Powell, J.); id. at 2766 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concur-
ring in part and dissenting).
120. Bakke leaves unclear whether the constitutional standard is applicable to blacks also, or
only to whites claiming reverse discrimination under an affirmative action plan. This issue is
more critical in the title VII context, since the Supreme Court has enunciated different standards
for judging discrimination against blacks under the Constitution and under title VII. Employ-
ment practices that have an adverse impact on blacks and are not justified by business necessity
violate title VII although they only violate the Constitution if some discriminatory purpose is
shown. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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and the government's interest in remedying discrimination is only con-
sidered compelling when there is a finding of discrimination, the Kaiser
quota would be illegal even under a constitutional test.
Unfortunately, it is not clear from Bakke what standard of review
should be applied to affirmative action programs implemented to com-
ply with the Executive Order, much less what interests are strong
enough to be recognized under the applicable constitutional test. The
Stevens group never reached the constitutional issue.' Of the five jus-
tices who did address the constitutional issue, only one, Justice Powell,
applied a strict scrutiny test, concluding that the use of quotas to benefit
minorities must serve a compelling purpose and must be necessary to
accomplish that purpose.12 2 However, since Justice Powell's opinion
was critical in affirming that a university can use a racial preference
although not a quota, it arguably should be given the weight of a ma-
jority opinion, at least for affirmative action plans challenged under the
various provisions of the Civil Rights Act.
In applying the strict scrutiny test, Justice Powell inferred the gov-
ernment's interest in remedying discrimination was not compelling in
the absence of judicial or administrative findings of discrimination or a
remedial scheme authorized by Congress. 2 3 Justice Powell specifically
rejected the goal of remedying societal discrimination as a compelling
purpose. 24 Two objectives are generally suggested as being served by
the Executive Order. One is the government's interest in ensuring that
all groups in society share equally in the employment opportunities
created and supported by government spending. In addition, the gov-
ernment has an interest in remedying the effects of past employment-
related discrimination that can be presumed to exist from severe under-
representations of minorities in an employer's workforce.1 5  Given
121. 98 S. Ct. at 2814 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Burger, C.J.,
Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., joined in the opinion).
122. Id. at 2749.
123. Justice Powell noted that classifications favoring victimized groups have never been ap-
proved absent a judicial, legislative, or administrative finding of a constitutional or statutory vio-
lation. Id. at 2757-58. He recognized the validity of congressionally authorized administrative
actions, and legislation passed by Congress pursuant to its powers under the thirteenth and four-
teenth amendments. Id. at 2755 n.41. However, he emphasized the need for "legislatively-deter-
mined criteria" and stressed that the classification should be responsive to "identified
discrimination." Id. at 2759.
Arguably, congressional approval of the Executive Order makes the Executive Order pro-
gram congressionally approved administrative action. Congressional authority to approve broad
racial classifications to remedy general employment discrimination can be found in U.S. CoNsT.
amend. XIII, § 2, and id. amend. XIV, § 5.
124. 98 S. Ct. at 2756-58.
125. See 118 CONG. REC. 1664 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Javits) (recognizing both government's
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Justice Powell's analysis, whether or not these purposes are considered
compelling may depend on whether the Executive Order has been rati-
fied by Congress.
Congressional ratification in 1972, the consonance of the purposes
served by both the Executive Order and title VII, 126 and the direct con-
trol Congress exercises over the OFCC are all factors that give the Ex-
ecutive Order program a status similar to that of a program enacted
directly by Congress and provide a basis for arguing its validity under
Bakke. At the time of ratification in 1972, Congress discussed and im-
plicitly affirmed the use of goals and timetables and remedial racial
preferences. It also debated and implicitly accepted the validity of us-
ing government contracts to enforce remedial action that went beyond
title VII and that would ensure that all groups within American society
share in the benefits resulting from government spending. Finally,
Congress recognized that requirements imposed under the Executive
Order do not rest on determinations of past discrimination. 127 Given
that the 1972 Congress apparently fully understood the operation of the
Executive Order program, and that present and future Congresses can
restrict the operation of the OFCC in any way, it seems the contract
compliance program should be considered as remedial legislation. Ac-
cordingly, it should not be necessary that specific determinations of dis-
crimination be made before an employer can implement an affirmative
action program involving some racial preference. Similarly, that the
Executive Order program is largely self-enforcing should not be taken
to indicate that the discrimination it remedies is not identifiable or is
merely societal discrimination.
A compelling government interest does not alone justify the use of
racial classifications. The classification must also be necessary in light
of the purpose to be achieved. Assuming, in light of the implicit con-
gressional authorization of the use of remedial preferences by govern-
ment contractors, that employers are allowed to use some degree of
ability to promote full utilization of minority employees and government's power to correct dis-
crimination); id at 4918 (remarks of Sen. Javits) (noting that government can affirmatively en-
courage nondiscrimination and full utilization of minority group employees and women through
its contracting power). These remarks were made during the debates in 1972 over the two amend-
ments that would have restricted the Executive Order program. See notes 80 & 88 supra. See also
EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d at 175, 179 (government has interest in having all
groups "fairly represented" in employment).
126. The Supreme Court has recognized that a primary objective of title VII is prophylactic:
to remove barriers that have operated to favor white male employees over other employees. Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 429-30 (1971).
127. See notes 80-90 and accompanying text supra.
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racial preference to comply with the Executive Order, the issue is
whether that preference can take the form of a goal or quota as used by
Kaiser.
In Bakke, the Brennan group upheld the use of quotas to remedy
societal discrimination. 2 Justice Powell, though, found that in light of
its objective of maintaining a diverse student body, Davis could only
make race "a factor" in its admissions program. 129 Race could only be
used as one factor among many because the particular goal that Justice
Powell recognized as compelling in Bakke-attaining a diverse student
body-is necessarily achieved through use of numerous factors. In
contrast to the goal of achieving diversity, the Executive Order focuses
particularly on minority group status and achievement. Its goal is to
upgrade the status of minority and women workers by forcing institu-
tional changes in hiring and promotion that will both remedy the ef-
fects of past discrimination and prevent future discrimination. In some
contexts, most notably the area of professional employment, these pur-
poses may perhaps be served through a decisional process that factors
in race among other attributes. But such a system is unrealistic in the
typical industrial employment context in which employment decisions
are not made with regard to a number of individual factors. For exam-
ple, in Weber, seniority was the only criterion used to select among the
applicants, all of whom were basically qualified. As seniority is al-
lowed as a dominant factor in selection for industrial opportunities,
race must also be considered a critical factor. The explicit considera-
tion of race is necessary to remedy the employment discrimination evi-
denced by statistics showing gross minority underutilization. That
alternate means, such as recruitment, would be unsuccessful is evi-
denced by the situation at Kaiser's plant in 1974. Minorities held 5 of
273 craft positions. The failure of less "drastic" ways of ensuring non-
discrimination and promoting job mobility in the skilled trades has
been well-documented. 30 Arguably, therefore, there were no means of
upgrading the skills of minorities and guaranteeing that the effects of
past discrimination would not be carried into the future other than by
128. 98 S. Ct. at 2789-93 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting).
129. Id. at 2762-63. As the Brennan group noted, there is no difference between allowing a
racial preference and allowing a quota, other than that the public might find the former more
palatable since it obscures the actual weight given to race. However, both result in some exclusion
of white candidates. Id. at 2793-94 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in
part and dissenting).
130. See generally W. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS: JOB DISCRIMINATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 281-362 (1977).
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targeting new training opportunities to minorities and women. Such
targeting can best be achieved through the use of goals or quotas.
The previous analysis illustrates that Bakke does not foreclose the
possibility of upholding a quota such as Kaiser's. However, if the inter-
ests served by the Executive Order are not considered "compelling" or
if quotas are rejected as unnecessary, then under Justice Powell's analy-
sis a quota could only be implemented in response to prior findings of
discrimination.' 3' This result is actually narrower than that reached in
Weber. Yet, Justice Powell also intimated that quotas might be per-
missible in circumstances broader than those suggested in Weber. For
example, Justice Powell cited with apparent approval the construction
industry cases, thus implying that prevailing OFCC standards rather
than title VII standards may be used to evaluate discrimination, and
that administrative findings of third-party discrimination may warrant
quota relief.'32 If these possibilities were further developed, perhaps
the OFCC could make industry-wide findings of discrimination in or-
der to legalize quotas in major industries.
CONCLUSION
It is important that the concept of identifiable discrimination ar-
ticulated by Justice Powell in Bakke 133 not be interpreted to mean "ac-
tual employer discrimination," as was demanded by the Weber
court. 134 The differentiation between employer and societal discrimi-
nation presents obvious evidentiary problems since no party before the
court in an affirmative action case has an interest in proving employer
discrimination. Moreover, the use of statistics in both the proof and
remedial stages of litigation under title VII and in the Executive Order
program makes it extremely difficult to separate the effects of societal
and employer discrimination. Given these difficulties, and the implicit
recognition of the importance of societal discrimination that is embod-
ied in the use of quotas in any circumstance, it is doubtful that the
constitutionality of racial classifications should depend on the
distinction.
Rather than being limited to findings of employer discrimination,
131. 98 S. Ct. at 2754-59.
132. Id. at 2754 n.40.
133. Id. at 2754-59.
134. 563 F.2d at 224-25.
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the concept of identifiable discrimination should be broadened in af-
firmative action litigation to include "presumptive" discrimination. Al-
though the Supreme Court has rejected the idea that disparate impact
or minority underrepresentation alone makes out a constitutional135 or
statutory violation,' 36 it has accepted the fact that a statistical under-
representation creates a presumption of discrimination that shifts to the
employer the burden of proving nondiscrimination. 37 When statistics
showing underrepresentation are used in accordance with a legisla-
tively approved remedial scheme such as the Executive Order program,
they should be weighed heavily by the courts in determining whether
an affirmative action program is justified by employment discrimina-
tion. The idea that a court can recognize the existence of probable dis-
crimination without making actual findings to that effect is supported
by early Executive Order decisions, by judicial acceptance of consent
decrees under title VII, and by congressional approval of the Executive
Order program in 1972.
Beyond the broad statutory and constitutional issues Weber raises,
the case demonstrates the reality of "progress" in "equal employment
opportunity" for minorities in this country. After ten years of enjoying
the legal rights to equal employment under the Civil Rights Act of
1964, minorities, who comprised thirty-nine percent of the area labor
force, held only two percent of the craft positions at Kaiser's plant.
Such statistics demonstrate the continuing effects of employment dis-
crimination, and that legal rights alone may result in little measurable
economic progress for minorities. As was noted in an early Executive
Order decision, "it is fundamental that civil rights, without economic
rights, are mere shadows."' 38 In order to remedy past and continuing
discrimination, and in order to guarantee some measure of economic
progress to minorities and women, training opportunities must be
targeted. Arguably, targeting cannot be achieved without the use of
quotas. At the least, modest entry quotas should be permitted 39 for
135. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
136. Disparate impact or extreme underrepresentation can constitute a statutory violation but
only if the employer cannot successfully rebut the inference of discrimination. Hazelwood School
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 311-13 (1977); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 339-40
(1977).
137. See note 106 supra.
138. Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 311 F. Supp. 1002, 1010 (E.D.Pa. 1970).
139. The 50% quota for Kaiser's program is misleading. In the first year the training program
admitted 7 blacks, and one black craftsman was hired from outside the plant. The same year, 6
whites were admitted into the training program, and 21 whites were hired as craftsmen from
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totally new training opportunities, with respect to which majority work-
ers have no existing rights or expectations.
Major industrial employers such as Kaiser are well-situated to
remedy both their own discrimination and other employment-related
discrimination that affects opportunities within their industries. Judi-
cial insistence on findings of discrimination either prior to or subse-
quent to the implementation of a quota will probably halt all voluntary
affirmative action programs by employers like Kaiser. Conditioning
preferential treatment on industry-wide administrative findings of dis-
crimination, and defining discrimination by OFCC standards, is prefer-
able to requiring judicial findings of title VII violations. Nonetheless,
even this option would significantly impede progress toward equal em-
ployment goals by making all affirmative action dependent on adminis-
trative proceedings. Remedial action would thus slow to a snail's pace.
This result is legally unnecessary, in light of the possibility of affirming
the legality of the Executive Order program and its system of self-en-
forcement, and recognizing that in the vast majority of cases title VII
and the Executive Order are complementary, and not contradictory.
KAREN ANN SINDELAR
outside the plant. Kaiser's program would have ensured an increase of approximately 2.5% mi-
nority craftsmen yearly. Petition for Writ of Certiorari on behalf of the United States and Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission at 3-5.
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